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aBSTRaCT
in liberal moral theory, interfering with someone’s deliberate engagement in a 
self-harming practice in order to promote their own good is often considered wrong-
fully paternalistic. But what if self-harming decisions are the product of an oppressive 
social context that imposes harmful norms on certain individuals, such as, arguably, 
in the case of cosmetic breast surgery? Clare Chambers suggests that such scenarios 
can mandate state interference in the form of prohibition. i argue that, unlike con-
ventional measures, Chambers’ proposal recognises that harmful, discriminatory 
norms entail a twofold collective moral obligation: to eliminate the harmful norm 
in the long run, but also to address unjust harm that is inflicted in the meantime. i 
show that these two obligations tend to pull in opposite directions, thus generating 
a serious tension in Chambers’ proposal which eventually leads to an undue com-
promising of the second obligation in favour of the first. Based on this discussion, i 
develop an alternative proposal which, instead of prohibiting breast implant surgery, 
offers compensation for the disadvantages suffered by individuals who decide not to 
have surgery.
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1. inTRODUCTiOn
Liberal moral theory generally considers paternalistic interventions, that is, in-
terventions with an individual’s choice that are justified exclusively in terms of the 
individual’s own good, as prima facie morally wrong. Call this the non-interven-
tion rule. The presumption behind the non-intervention rule is that we ought to 
respect the individual’s autonomy—unless we have reason to think that someone’s 
self-harming behaviour is not the result of that individual’s autonomous choice, for 
instance because of psychological or cognitive impairments that undermine some 
minimal requirements of rationality, we ought not to interfere with their decision in 
order to promote their own good.
Clare Chambers does not object to the general liberal stand against paternal-
ism. However, she argues that some self-harming choices do permit state interven-
tion. These are choices made in the context of discriminatory and harmful social norms 
(see Chambers 2008). Such norms typically require individuals to inflict some form 
of harm on themselves in order to attain socially regulated benefits or to avoid so-
cially regulated disadvantages. importantly, harmful social norms are characterised 
by the fact that the link between the self-harming behaviour and the regulated ben-
efits is a purely social one—engaging in the harmful practice makes it easier or more 
likely for the individual to attain the benefit primarily or only in virtue of the exis-
tence of certain social conventions, values, or attitudes. Hence, athletes who decide 
to undergo a harmful training routine in order to break a personal record are not 
victims of a harmful social norm. Their engagement in harmfully intensive train-
ing allows them to break their personal record independently of surrounding social 
values or attitudes.
Sometimes the harm-conditionality of socially regulated benefits applies only to 
some groups in society but not others. Hence, while some individuals need to engage 
in self-harming behaviour in order to attain certain benefits, others can attain com-
parable benefits ‘for free’, without having to pay the costs of self-harm. in such cases, 
the relevant norm is both harmful and discriminatory, thus undermining social or 
political equality. Chambers suggests that such norms are particularly problematic if 
they feed into existing inequalities, such as those related to gender or race.
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according to Chambers, the practice of cosmetic breast implant surgery is moti-
vated by such a harmful and discriminatory social norm. The relevant norm requires 
that women have breasts of a certain shape and size in order to be socially valued and 
respected (in virtue of being considered sufficiently beautiful or sexually attractive) 
and to succeed in a number of career paths, such as being an actress, or a model, or 
simply to “become famous” (see Chambers 2008, 197-198). as a result, the norm dis-
advantages women who do not conform in psychological, professional, or economic 
respects. Chambers argues that the underlying norm only affects women, hence is 
discriminatory. it is also harmful, in several different ways. Chambers focusses on 
physical harm and status harm. Breast implants, Chambers explains, involve painful 
and medically unnecessary surgery which likely requires lifelong further operations 
and poses serious long-term health risks (e.g. in the form of implant rupture or cap-
sular contracture). in addition, she argues, having breast implants inflicts status harm 
on women because it casts them as objects of male sexual desire, hence as inferior 
to men (see Chambers 2008, 186-190). Finally, breast implant surgery and the further 
medical treatments which are likely to occur require substantial financial investments 
and thus impose economic harm in addition to physical and status harm.
against this background, Chambers defends prohibition of breast implants both 
as a legitimate and, at least in principle, effective means of addressing the underlying 
harmful and discriminatory social norm. importantly, her proposal aims to prosecute 
not women who seek breast implants, but individuals and companies who provide it, 
such as surgeons or manufacturers of implants (Chambers, 2008, 217).
i believe prohibition provides the wrong solution to an accurately diagnosed 
problem. For this purpose, i first identify a crucial strength of Chambers’ proposal. 
Unlike conventional measures, such as education campaigns and media regulations, 
it recognised that the existence of discriminatory, harmful norms poses a twofold 
moral obligation—not only to eliminate the norm in the long run, but also to address 
the ongoing infliction of unjust harms while it remains in place (Section 2). Second, 
i discuss Chambers’ defence of prohibition in more detail (Section 3). i argue that 
Chambers’ defence against paternalism fails (Section 3.1), and that prohibition’s cre-
dentials with regard to promoting gender equality, and providing respect for women 
are more mixed than she admits (Sections 3.2 and 3.3). i then discuss how these prob-
lems reflect a tension between the different requirements entailed by the first and 
the second moral obligation, and conclude that prohibition ought to be rejected for 
unduly compromising the second moral obligation in favour of the first. Drawing on 
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these insights, i develop an alternative proposal that combines conventional mea-
sures, requirements for informed medical consent, and compensation payments 
(Section 4).
2. WHY PROHiBiTiOn? THe TWOFOLD mORaL 
OBLiGaTiOn FOR HaRmFUL SOCiaL nORmS
according to Chambers, women’s desire for breast implants is the product of a 
social context that links women’s conforming to objectifying norms of physical ap-
pearance with beauty, success, and social appreciation. it therefore seems appropri-
ate to focus on exposing and altering the circumstances that lead women to desire 
breast implants, rather than hindering women from having breast implants once 
these social circumstances have made their mark. Frequently discussed measures 
such as education campaigns and media and advertisement regulations try to achieve 
exactly this. education campaigns try to expose harmful and discriminatory norms 
as symptoms of a background culture of gender inequality and misogyny, hence bat-
tling harmful social norms by more comprehensive measures. media and advertise-
ment regulations try to hinder modelling agencies or advertisement and movie com-
panies from primarily engaging or displaying women who correspond to harmful and 
objectifying social norms. By increasing the diversity of female body types presented 
in media and advertisement, they aim to counteract harmful and objectifying beauty 
standards for women. i refer to these measures as conventional measures.
Chambers is aware of conventional measures and acknowledges their role in 
undermining harmful social norms (Chambers 2008, 68). in fact, she seems to under-
stand prohibition and conventional measures as complementary rather than compet-
ing. However, the question remains as to why we should consider the more provoca-
tive idea of prohibiting breast implants rather than simply make do with conventional 
measures that appear to be less problematic. according to Chambers, the question 
whether conventional measures are sufficient or need to be complemented with pro-
hibition depends on how harmful the practice is that the harmful norm prescribes. 
Only if state prohibition does not seem “vastly disproportional” compared to the 
harm that it tries to prevent should we consider the option of prohibition (Chambers 
2008, 198).
By stating the case for prohibition like that, Chambers refrains from pointing 
out that her proposal in fact addresses a systematic blind spot of conventional ap-
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proaches to harmful social norms. While measures like education campaigns and 
media regulations are helping to change harmful, discriminatory norms in the long 
run, they leave unaddressed the ongoing harm and injustice suffered by the individu-
als who are affected by the norms in the meantime. For the time it takes conventional 
measures to change a relevant norm, a period i refer to as transition period, the norm 
continues to impose a dilemma on individuals affected by it: to either pay the price 
of self-harm in exchange for socially regulated benefits that others acquire ‘for free’, 
or to forego the benefit altogether and hence live with the resulting disadvantages.
Consider the case of breast implants. Here, women in the transition period 
either continue to undertake the painful and risky surgery so as to conform their ap-
pearance to an objectifying beauty standard, or they are sanctioned with psychologi-
cal, economic, or professional disadvantages described above for failing to conform. 
Yet it seems that a society that is responsible for maintaining a harmful and discrimi-
natory norm is also responsible for the harm and injustice that this norm inflicts on 
individuals during the period in which it is maintained.1 This suggests that societies 
which maintain a harmful, discriminatory social norm have a twofold moral obliga-
tion—not only to change or eliminate the norm in the long run, but also to address 
the norm’s ongoing harmful and unjust effects on individuals.
importantly, these two obligations coincide only in cases where the transition 
period is sufficiently short—i.e., where the norm would cease to exist shortly after 
means for eliminating it have been implemented. in such cases, it might be possible 
to eliminate the harmful norm before the individuals affected by it have experienced 
significant harm and injustice. as a result, both collective moral obligations could 
be discharged simultaneously by eliminating the norm. But this scenario looks like a 
mere theoretical possibility. in reality, harmful and discriminatory norms tend to be 
deeply culturally rooted,  only allowing social progress at a snail’s pace. even after the 
norms have been publicly acknowledged for the evil that they are, and conventional 
measures have been taken to challenge them, they nonetheless continue to exert their 
influence for long periods of time. in this case, conventional measures like education 
campaigns and media regulations will tackle the first moral obligation, but generally 
offer no way of addressing the second. They promote justice via social change in the 
1.  note that i will not address in this paper the question whether members of a society are under 
a retrospective collective obligation to address the current generation of a disadvantaged group for 
norm-induced harms that have been inflicted by their predecessors on the previous generation(s) of 
the disadvantaged group.
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long term, but effectively neglect to comabt the harm and injustice that is inflicted on 
individuals in the meantime.
in accordance with Chambers’ ‘proportionality’ consideration, one could 
admit that the second moral obligation is negligible in cases where the relevant harm 
appears relatively small, such as with regard to social norms requiring women to 
wear make-up. Yet, if the practice involves a painful and risky surgery that perma-
nently forces someone’s body to conform to a sexually objectifying beauty standard, 
such as in the case at hand, the ongoing infliction of harm in the transition period 
becomes an urgent moral concern alongside the need for long-term change. Hence, 
Chambers’ proposal touches a crucial blind spot of conventional measures against 
harmful social norms. The question is whether we should also credit her proposal as 
a promising way of eliminating that blind spot.
3. PROHiBiTinG BReaST imPLanTS
Chambers provides three arguments as to why prohibiting breast implants is 
principally a legitimate and effective way of undermining the harmful social norm 
that underlies the practice of breast implants. Her first argument aims to deflect the 
objection that her proposal is paternalistic. Her second argument can be understood 
as a non-paternalistic justification of prohibition. it states that, even if prohibition 
interferes with women’s autonomy, it is justified in doing so because it achieves an 
overriding good—the elimination of the norm, and hence the promotion of gender 
equality. The third argument claims that prohibition is necessary to respect women 
as “desiring, choosing agents.”
i will show that the first two arguments are in fact best understood as instrumen-
tal arguments for prohibition, interfering with the choices and preferences of women 
today in order to improve the situation for women tomorrow. i will reject these ar-
guments on the grounds that they impose unjust costs for social change on women 
who are affected by the norm today. The third argument, by contrast, provides a con-
stitutive argument for prohibition: it defends prohibition as a necessary requirement 
for respecting women as equal human agents. By arguing that the requirements for 
respect are more complex than Chambers admits, and ultimately best served by a 
policy of informed choice, i reject the argument from respect, too, and conclude that 
overall the case for prohibition is unconvincing.
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3.1 aUTOnOmY
To begin with, Chambers argues that her proposal is non-paternalistic because 
it enforces rather than contradicts the preferences of the individual whose choice it 
interferes with. This argument refers to Danny Scoccia’s account of paternalism (see 
Chambers 2008, 222). Scoccia argues that interference with an individual’s choice for 
her own good does not violate the individual’s autonomy if the choice fails to express 
accurately the individual’s preferences, and the individual would consent to the in-
terference if she were fully rational (see Scoccia 1990, 330-31, cited in Chambers ibid.). 
according to Chambers, a ban on breast implants fulfils this criterion because it 
would undermine the social norm that motivates breast implants. Prohibition would 
thus allow women to achieve the regulated benefits without undergoing painful and 
risky surgery—and this, says Chambers, is what women affected by the norm actu-
ally prefer (see Chambers 2008, 223). as a result, Chambers argues, prohibiting breast 
implants would increase rather than limit the autonomy of women.
 note that this argument is not simply equating autonomy with preference-
satisfaction. it is merely piggybacking on the fact that conflict with an individual’s 
preferences is widely considered a necessary condition for paternalistic interventions 
with that individual’s choice (see arneson 1980, Sunstein 1991, Thaler & Sunstein 
2008). On most accounts of paternalism, i am not acting paternalistically unless i am 
limiting, changing, or manipulating your decision against your own preference. as 
a result, showing that prohibition does not conflict with the preferences of women 
would be a promising way to escape the charges of paternalism.
But Chambers’ argument turns out to be problematic. First of all, she presup-
poses that most women, even those who are willing to undergo breast surgery, actu-
ally have a preference for the non-existence of the social norm. She admits that pro-
hibition of breast implants would undermine the autonomy of individuals who do 
not prefer achieving the benefit without undergoing surgery, but thinks that these are 
cases of “extreme particularity” and therefore do not support a decisive objection (see 
Chambers 2008, 226). However, if we think of the latter group of women as having 
internalised the social norm, it seems unlikely that their case will be a rare exception. 
individuals who have internalised a social norm do not merely have an instrumental-
ist awareness that corresponding to the norm will bring them desired advantages, but 
have made the norm part of their personal belief and value systems. This situation 
seems to be rather widespread. For example, it seems that many, if not most, people 
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in Western societies hold a more or less conscious belief that thin people are more 
attractive than fat ones; that, as a woman, being physically attractive is conducive or 
even necessary for happiness and success in life; and, finally, that having breasts of a 
certain shape and size is part of that requirement.
But if internalisation of social norms is the rule rather than the exception, most 
individuals affected by the norm will not have a preference for the norm’s non-exis-
tence that outranks their preference for complying with the norm. Having been so-
cialised in a society that endorses these norms, they might never have contemplated 
that the relevant norms could be different, or what their lives might be like if they 
were. Hence, the idea that individuals may not have a preference for the non-exis-
tence of the social norm provides a stronger objection to Chambers’ proposal than 
she admits.
Chambers could object that women who have internalised the norm that moti-
vates cosmetic breast surgery are not fully rational, and that they would have a prefer-
ence for the norm to be eliminated if only they would fully understand their situation. 
We might feel uneasy about basing state prohibition on such reasoning by conjec-
ture, but for now, let us assume that the (actual or ‘rationalised’) preference structure 
of the large majority of women matches Chambers’ description. assume that, after 
thoroughly contemplating their situation, most women agree that their desire to have 
breasts of a certain shape and size is the product of a patriarchal society that values 
women primarily as objects of male sexual gratification, and that they would be better 
off without the objectifying norm. Suppose that women therefore prefer, first, for the 
norm not to exist (which means being able to achieve the benefit without having to 
undergo surgery); and second, if their first preference is unattainable, women prefer 
to undergo surgery in order to attain the benefit. if women’s actual preference struc-
ture indeed matches this description, Chambers suggests, prohibition would not be 
paternalistic, because it would realise their highest preference by destroying a norm 
which hinders achieving it.
Under this assumption, however, Chambers’ proposal still faces the problem of 
being based on an account of the individuals’ preferences that is in relevant ways 
incomplete: it addresses women’s preferences for different ends without considering 
the means by which these ends will be brought about. But means are important. if 
my desired end can only be brought about by means that i find objectionable, i might 
well decide to forego the desired end and settle for the second-best option. For in-
stance, i have a preference for you giving me one million dollars over you not giving 
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me one million dollars, yet if you inform me that your means of obtaining the one 
million dollars is to kidnap a child and demand a ransom, i would probably change 
my preference with regard to the money. in the case at hand, Chambers presuppos-
es that women prefer for the norm not to exist, but she does not consider whether 
women might object to achieving this end by banning cosmetic breast surgery. But 
women may prefer getting rid of the harmful norm and still reject prohibition of cos-
metic breast surgery. This holds true even if (following Chambers and Scoccia), we 
require their decisions on the matter to fulfil some adequate conditions of rational-
ity. Supposedly, such conditions for rationality would require, among other things, 
that women know that a ban on cosmetic breast surgery would result in a collapse 
of the social norm (assuming that it does), and that this would allow them to achieve 
the desired benefit without breast implants. However, there might still be women 
who consider prohibition an inappropriate response to harmful social norms. For 
instance, a woman might find it a problematic infringement of her and other women’s 
authority over their own bodies to prohibit cosmetic breast surgery. She might think 
that women should refrain from having breast implants, but not be hindered to have 
them against their own wills. as a result, there might be women who principally 
welcome the elimination of the relevant norm but who object to the prohibition of 
breast implants, without thereby acting irrationally.
now, let this point be granted, too, and assume that women do in fact have a pref-
erence for abandoning the social norm by prohibiting breast implants. This leads us 
to what i believe is the most pressing problem of Chambers’ account: even if we grant 
all the above assumptions, it is still uncertain whether prohibition will fulfil the pref-
erences of women who are affected by it. To see this, consider again Chambers’ claim 
that her proposal enforces individuals’ preferences. This claim crucially depends on 
the idea that prohibition will undermine the relevant norm within a time frame of 
less than one generation. if the norm stays in place for longer than that, individu-
als who are affected by Chambers’ proposal can achieve neither their first nor their 
second preference: they cannot achieve the benefits without having breast surgery 
because during their lifetime, the norm is still regulating their desired benefits—and 
they cannot achieve these benefits by undergoing breast surgery since this option has 
been banned by the state.
Chambers agrees that such a situation clearly has to be avoided (see Chambers 
2008, 208). But it is not clear that her proposal can realistically do that. For one thing, 
it is not evident, and Chambers does not give us an idea of, how long the process 
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of eliminating the harmful norm is likely to take. The history of Western beauty 
standards is ambivalent in that regard, hence only provides a very rough idea of the 
expectable time scale. Without directed interventions, some beauty norms seem to 
fluctuate at the scale of decades, while others vary very little over centuries. even if 
prohibition would succeed in undermining the relevant norm within a single decade, 
for women who are denied breast surgery early in the period of prohibition the costs 
might still be high and the benefits meagre. When the harmful norm finally ceases 
to function, these women will be in a different stage of their lives. They might have 
lived through a period continuously perceiving their bodies as inadequate and in 
need of surgical improvement, possibly at a time of their lives crucial to the estab-
lishment of one’s sense of self-worth. Chances to enter a desired career in model-
ling, entertainment, or acting might have passed irretrievably. as a result, even in 
the best case scenarios, the net benefit of prohibition might be a very limited one for 
these women. This problem is augmented by the fact that it is unclear how significant 
a contribution prohibition would make in undermining the underlying norm over 
and above what could already be achieve by conventional measures like media and 
advertisement regulations. neither of these measures has been tested, alone or in 
combination. it might well be that what determines the impact of the norm is not so 
much the actual number of women who conform to it, but rather the fact that these 
women’s bodies are highly overrepresented in the media, and are presented as more 
desirable, successful, or valuable than others. in that case, the contribution of media 
regulations would be substantial but the contribution of prohibition only marginal, 
hence probably insufficient for outweighing the costs it imposes on affected women. 
as a result, even if we grant all of Chambers’ assumptions about women’s preference 
structures, there are reasons to doubt that prohibition is in accordance with the pref-
erences of those women who would be affected by it.
3.2 GenDeR eqUaLiTY
One could object that there is an ambiguity about whom Chambers’ proposal is 
primarily trying to help —women who are currently affected by the norm, or future 
generations of women. if we assume the former, as argued above, Chambers’ pro-
posal is likely to conflict with the preferences of those women who are affected by it, 
hence cannot be defended against the charge of paternalism on those grounds. But 
some passages suggest that Chambers might be more concerned with the harm and 
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inequality confronted by ‘women in general’ in a particular society, i.e. mostly future 
generations of women in that society (see Chambers 2008, 265). if that is the primary 
aim of Chambers’ proposal, it would not be paternalistic despite conflicting with the 
preferences of those who are affected by it, because the interference no longer aims to 
promote their own good. instead, prohibition would be an interference with the au-
tonomy of women today in order to reduce the inequality and harm suffered by future 
generations of women. But again, there are several problems with this argument.
3.2.1 THe PROBLem OF eFFiCaCY
if Chambers’ proposal is successful in the long run, future generations of 
women will no longer be subject to the harmful norm. But there are reasons to doubt 
that Chambers’ proposal will be a particularly good or effective tool in achieving this 
aim. For one thing, as argued above, prohibition of cosmetic breast surgery will not 
erase or even significantly reduce the pervasive imagery that promotes the harmful 
norm. There will still be individuals who conform to the standard without surgery, 
and there will still be image editing programmes. all prohibition can achieve is to de-
crease the number of women whose bodies conform to the social norm. But by doing 
that, it also increases exclusivity. in some examples, such as body size or tanned skin, 
historic records suggest a positive correlation between the rarity of a physical char-
acteristic and its appeal as a beauty standard. it is thus possible that Chambers’ pro-
posal increases rather than decreases the appeal and effectiveness of the social norm 
underlying cosmetic breast surgery.
more importantly, even if prohibition succeeds in undermining the particular 
harmful social norm motivating breast surgery, the benefits for future generations of 
women might well be sparse. as Chambers acknowledges, the social norm under con-
sideration is the product of a wider context of gender inequality and oppression. Yet, 
by focussing on particular social norms, her proposal is addressing the symptoms of 
gender inequality without challenging the underlying causes. Hence, it seems likely 
that she is battling a Hydra. norms regarding the size or shape of women’s breasts 
might change or disappear, but unless the background issues of gender inequal-
ity and oppression are challenged, similarly harmful norms are likely to replace it. 
again, these arguments cast doubt on the idea that specific intervention in the form 
of prohibition has any substantial impact in the battle against harmful social norms 
and gender inequality above and beyond what could be achieved by conventional 
Journal of Practical Ethics
 JESSICA LAIMANN48
measures alone, especially if they are designed to address the underlying problem of 
gender inequality and the objectification of women in a more comprehensive manner.
3.2.2 THe PROBLem OF UnFaiR TRanSiTiOn COSTS
Finally, assume that prohibition is an effective means for undermining harmful 
social norms. in that case, the previous discussion nevertheless suggests that 
Chambers’ proposal involves unfair transition costs. To see this, consider the following 
toy account of transitional justice. assume that the alleviation of something wrong-
ful, such as undermining a harmful and unequal social norm, in the long term requires 
that certain costs be paid in the short term. Who should pay the costs? in case someone 
can be identified as responsible for creating or sustaining the wrong, the obvious re-
sponse would be to require them to pay. in the case at hand, the relevant wrong, 
i.e. the harmful and unequal social norm, has not been created or sustained by any 
specific individual or group of individuals. instead, though the norm likely results 
from values whose existence precedes that of most current members of society, it is 
currently sustained by ‘society as a whole’ in the form of many small interactions of 
its members that reproduce the underlying values.
as a result, the responsibility for sustaining the social norm is a collective one. 
This suggests that the costs, too, ought to be paid collectively. Chambers’ proposal, 
however, by suggesting to undermine the social norm by hindering women who want 
to have breast implants from having them, only affects women. One could argue 
that, like all members of society, women share responsibility for sustaining the social 
norm. 2 moreover, by undertaking the surgery, women who desire breast implants 
would further reinforce the harmful norm, hence take on additional responsibil-
ity for the norm’s existence. Yet, unlike other members of society, women who are 
willing to undergo surgery are also the norm’s primary victims. after all, their desire 
to have breast implants, according to Chambers’ analysis, is simply an attempt to 
overcome the psychological, professional, or economic disadvantages that the norm 
imposes on them—costs which apparently weigh heavy enough for them to make a 
painful, risky, and expensive surgery an attractive option. Hence, instead of distrib-
uting the costs equally among those who are responsible for sustaining the social 
2.  acknowledging that the victims of the norm are largely women, while the beneficiaries of the 
norm are largely men, one could also argue that men bear primary responsibility and hence ought to 
pay the lion’s share of the costs (see may & Strikwerda 1994). This would strengthen the case against 
Chambers’ proposal, which put the costs exclusively on women.
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norm, Chambers’ proposal puts the lion’s share of the costs on women—largely on 
those who are already most negatively affected by the norm’s existence. Distributing 
of the costs for social change at the expense of those women who suffer the strongest 
disadvantages under the status quo effectively suggests fighting a form of oppression 
at the cost of the oppressed, hence is a problematic means of promoting justice and 
gender equality.
it could be argued that this injustice is mitigated by the fact that those women 
who are the norms’ primary victims would also be the primary beneficiaries of a ban 
on breast implants that undermines the harmful norm. But in the light of the previ-
ous discussion, we can see that the injustice is instead further augmented by a form 
of transitional injustice. as argued above, the timescale at which the mechanism for 
undermining social norms by prohibition operates is likely to be such that the indi-
viduals who pay the costs will enjoy the benefits only to a limited degree or not at all. 
if Chambers’ proposal succeeds, future women would indeed no longer have to face 
the pressure to undertake unnecessary and harmful surgery. But women in the transi-
tion period pay the price of undermining a harmful social norm without reaping the 
benefits. instead, prohibition effectively deprives these women of their only available 
means for overcoming the psychological, economic, or professional disadvantages 
that the norm continues to impose. in sum, even if Chambers’ proposal would in the 
long run prove effective in undermining the harmful norm and in promoting gender 
equality, this progress comes at a price. instead of being borne equally by those re-
sponsible for the norm’s existence, the costs for undermining the norm are dispro-
portionately shouldered by women who suffer mostly under it.
3.3 ReSPeCT
i have argued that the first two defences of Chambers’ proposal are problematic. 
Pace Chambers, prohibition is susceptible to paternalism charges because it may not 
be in accordance with the preferences of those affected by it. in addition, it achieves 
progress with respect to gender equality only by disproportionally burdening those 
who it claims to protect—individuals who are affected by the harmful, discrimina-
tory norms. i will now consider a third defence of Chambers’ proposal, which says 
that the prohibition of breast implants is necessary to provide respect for women.
Before i begin, note that Chambers’ argument about respect is logically inde-
pendent from the argument regarding gender equality in the previous section. The 
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previous argument about gender equality addresses the instrumental value of prohibi-
tion in undermining the harmful social norm, and in advancing gender equality more 
generally. The argument about respect is also concerned with gender equality, but is 
looking at prohibition in a constitutive rather than in an instrumental way. it is not 
considering prohibition primarily as a tool for undermining the norm and promoting 
gender equality, but instead as a communicative act that is constitutive of respecting 
women as equals. Hence, prohibiting breast implants could be detrimental or neutral 
for promoting gender equality in the instrumental sense—for instance because it is 
ineffective, or makes the norm more rather than less powerful—and, at the same time, 
contribute towards gender equality in the constitutive sense because it is an act of re-
specting women as equals. Thus, the question in the following is whether the benefits 
of prohibition in its constitutive role can make up for unjust costs that it imposes in 
its instrumental role by curtailing women’s autonomy and disproportionally burden-
ing them in the quest for social change.
For Chambers, the constitutive case seems to be a clear one. The message com-
municated by allowing a woman to have breast implants, Chambers argues, is that her 
feeling of inadequacy with natural breasts, and her resulting desire to undergo painful 
and dangerous surgery “are understandable and worthy of respect” (Chambers 2008, 
198-199). according to Chambers, we are thereby also expressing respect for the social 
reality in which women develop the desire to have breast implants, hence express our 
support for the status quo (ibid.). Prohibition, by contrast, is an attempt at saying “you 
as an individual are worthy of more respect than is compatible with you undergoing 
breast surgery [for instance] in an attempt to become successful” (Chambers 2008, 
200). in view of this, Chambers concludes that it is impossible to respect women’s 
desire to have breast implants and at the same time respect them as “desiring, choos-
ing agents” (Chambers 2008, 198). Only by prohibiting breast implants can we voice 
criticisms of the status quo and the role of women in it, and hence respect women 
who are affected by the harmful norm.
This argument forcefully addresses a valid concern, yet i believe that the issue of 
respect in the context of harmful and discriminatory social norms is more complex 
than Chambers acknowledges. in the following, i argue that, once we consider a 
more nuanced account of respect, impeding women from having breast implants may 
not be necessary, and, in fact, may even be detrimental, to respecting them as equal 
agents.
To begin with, it is important to understand how Chambers’ discussion of respect 
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is connected to concerns about harm. Chambers’ argument about respect suggests 
that respecting women requires us to prevent them from inflicting harm on them-
selves, at least if that harm is the product of a discriminatory social norm. assuming 
that risky illegal alternatives can be kept at bay, prohibiting breast implants might be 
an effective way of protecting women from the physical, status, and economic harm 
that this procedure involves. i will refer to these harms as harms of compliance. Yet, as 
argued in Section 2, the harms that are caused by the social norm underlying breast 
implants go beyond the physical, status, and economic harm of having breast implant 
surgery. They also include psychological harm, such as the internalised feeling of in-
adequacy that is apparently pressing enough to make a painful and dangerous surgery 
an attractive option for many women; and economic and professional harm in cases 
where one’s professional success is impeded by not conforming to the norm. i will 
refer to these harms as harms of non-compliance.
Chambers acknowledges harms of compliance and harms of non-compliance as 
relevant in the argument about prohibition (Chambers 2008, 210). Yet, her argument 
about respect focusses on the harms of compliance (mostly physical harm and status 
harm) and largely neglects the effect prohibition might have with regard to the harms 
of non-compliance. On Chambers’ account, respecting women requires protecting 
them from the harms of compliance by legally preventing them from having breast 
implants. as the discussion in Section 3.2 suggests, this strategy has troublesome 
effects. Prohibiting women from undertaking breast implants will soothe neither the 
psychological, nor the economic or professional harm that they hoped to alleviate 
by having breast implant surgery. instead, it forces women to confront these harms 
against their own choice for as long as the norm remains effective—a period which, as 
i have argued, might stretch over several decades. as a result, Chambers’ suggestion 
for how to best repect women involves exposing them to the harms of non-compli-
ance which, judging from their sincere desire for surgery, for them seems to consti-
tute the greater of two evils.
Take a moment to note the crucial role of the argument about respect in jus-
tifying prohibition. From a merely instrumental perspective, prohibition would 
effectively expose some women against their own choice to psychological, profes-
sional, and economic harm in order to improve the situation for future generations 
of women. This justification, i argued, is problematic because it effectively suggests 
ending a form of oppression at the cost of the oppressed. But if Chmabers succeeds 
in providing an alternative, constitutive justification, accotding to which protecting-
Journal of Practical Ethics
 JESSICA LAIMANN52
women from the harms of compliance is a necessary requirement for respecting them, 
even at the costs of exposing them to the harms of non-compliance against their own 
will, the problem above loses its force.
However, it is not obvious that Chambers’ way of negotiating the different 
kinds of norm-induced harms is the only, let alone the best, way to provide respect 
for women who are affected by discriminatory social norms. Respecting women may 
require us to equally protect them from all the unjust harms that the norm inflicts on 
them, or to protect them first of all from those harms that they themselves judge to be 
the most pressing ones. Thus, an objection to Chambers’ account of respect would 
say that the very fact that many women decide to have breast implants in spite of 
the harm the procedure involves, demonstrates that Chambers is focussing on the 
wrong sort of harms. These women, so the argument goes, disagree with Chambers’ 
understanding of what it means to respect them. Their decision bears evidence that 
for them, the psychological, economic, or professional harms of non-compliance are 
of more pressing concern than the physical and status (and economic) harms of com-
pliance. To them, the choice to have breast implants might be an act of self-care in 
unfavourable circumstances, even if it amounts to nothing more than trading one set 
of unjust harms for another. Prohibition, by contrast, not only deprives these women 
of authority over a decision with regard to their own bodies, but ignores that, from 
their own perspective, the physical and status harm of breast surgery might be a less 
humiliating and painful experience than non-conformity with the harmful norm.
To this, Chambers could respond that most women’s decision to have breast im-
plants may not correctly reflect their weighing up of all the different harms involved. 
Women who decide in favour of breast implants, she could argue, might be unaware 
of the status harm that undergoing surgery would inflict on them, because status 
harm is much more elusive than physical and economic harm. Unlike the physical 
and economic harms and risks of cosmetic breast surgery, status harm does not regu-
larly feature on patient leaflets in cosmetic clinics, or appear among the top hits of an 
internet search for ‘breast implants surgery.’ instead, status harm is often disguised 
and requires perspicacious social analysis to become visible. most women who desire 
breast implants will therefore not be aware that this procedure involves complying 
with a harmful norm that casts them as inferiors. as a result, Chambers could object, 
a woman’s choice to have breast implants is likely to be based on information that 
are incomplete in crucial respects, and should therefore not be understood as an in-
formed decision that demands our respect.
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However, the fact that someone’s decision to engage in a self-harming practice 
is based on their incomplete understanding of the harms involved does not usually 
suggest prohibition of the practice as a go-to remedy in the name of respect. instead, 
it seems that our response for respecting individuals as desiring, choosing agents 
would be to ensure that all the relevant information is available to them. Hence, it 
seems that respecting women as desiring, choosing agents first of all requires pro-
viding them with information about the status harm that breast implants surgery 
involves. moreover, insofar as a woman’s decision to have breast implants is enforc-
ing the harmful norm and is thus not only harming herself but also other women in 
the present and future, an informed decision should also require information about 
these negative externalities.
To this, Chambers might reply that a full understanding of the status harm and 
negative externalities involved in having breast implants is simply incompatible with 
the deliberate decision of having them. She could argue that a woman cannot at the 
same time be aware that breast implants cast her, and other women who feel com-
pelled to having them, as an inferior object of male sexual desire and yet believe that 
having breast implants is a prudent thing to do in her situation. a woman’s deci-
sion to have breast implants, Chambers could argue, can only be a symptom of her 
having internalised the idea that women with natural breasts are indeed inadequate. 
Hence, Chambers might object, there is no need to have women reconsider their de-
cision about breast implants in the light of information about status harm, because 
we already know what their decision will be.
There are several ways to respond to this. First, one could insist that allowing 
women to make an informed decision based on information about all the relevant 
harms is nevertheless a requirement of respect in this situation—hence, that respect-
ing women as desiring, choosing agents requires us to provide them with resources to 
critically reassess their decision, even if we could already be sure what the outcome of 
that reassessment will be. Second, one could argue that women’s reasons for having 
breast implants, and the meaning of that decision, might be more nuanced and rea-
soned than the above objection admits. Women may fully understand and oppose 
the harmful norm that requires them to have breast implants and yet feel that having 
breast implants is, all things considered, the most prudent option in their situation. 
Chambers would certainly agree that understanding and opposing harmful, discrim-
inatory social norms does not prevent women from being affected by them. Hence, 
a woman might be fully aware of the problematic nature of her nagging feeling of 
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inadequacy with natural breasts. Yet, she might find the feeling hurtful and distract-
ing; or she might find that dealing with it on a daily basis is simply taking too much 
of her time and energy—time and energy that could be more productively spent on 
a career in science, or, as it were, on plotting a feminist revolution that will eradicate 
these concerns for good. in either case, the woman’s decision to have breast implants 
would not express a naïve endorsement of the norm that motivates it. it would rather 
be a costly but reasoned compromise which negotiates the burdens of the norm in a 
way that best allows her to realise her personal goals and values. Furthermore, since 
the decision to have breast implants is first of all a matter of women’s authority over 
their own bodies, respecting women requires that we leave it up to themselves how to 
weigh the problem of negative externalities into that decision.
as a result, we can agree with Chambers that respecting women requires alter-
ing the social reality that leads them to desire breast implants, and at the same time 
object to the idea that we should prohibit women from acting on that desire. instead, 
providing women with respect requires that we make them aware of what precisely 
they are buying into when opting for cosmetic breast augmentation. now, after re-
considering their decision critically, and recognizing the harms that confront them 
either way, they might still come to the conclusion that having breast implants is 
overall the most prudent thing to do. That very decision would also be evidence for 
the fact that women are not willing or able to make the sacrifice Chambers’ proposal 
asks them to make in order to speed up the norm-eliminating social process leading 
to a better future for other women. One might still hold that this choice would be 
lacking in self-respect or egotistic. But to prohibit breast implants, and hence to 
force women to face the harms of non-compliance against their own judgement, is to 
further disrespect them as desiring, choosing agents. as a result, the only appropriate 
reaction, in the name of respect for women, is to continue to criticise and challenge 
the disrespectful circumstances which make this choice an attractive one in the first 
place.
4. an aLTeRnaTiVe PROPOSaL
The discussion of Chambers’ proposal illustrates how trying to address the 
problem of harmful, discriminatory social norms pulls us in opposite directions. 
The reason for that, i have argued, is the twofold moral obligation posed by the ex-
istence of these norms. While the obligation to eliminate the harmful norm calls for 
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powerful measures of undermining it, which might additionally burden those who 
already suffer most under the norm, the obligation to address the ongoing norm-
induced harm requires that we, at best, alleviate these harms immediately, and, at 
least, refrain from worsening the situation for women affected by them. Chambers’ 
proposal, in principle, recognizes not only the first, but also the second moral obliga-
tion. On these grounds, we should expect her proposal to be an improvement upon 
conventional measures for addressing harmful social norms. Yet, a closer discussion 
of the details of Chambers’ defence revealed substantial problems which reflect the 
tension between the two moral obligations. even if prohibition is a powerful tool for 
undermining social norms that motivate a self-harming practice like breast implants 
– which, i argued, is uncertain – it might come at significant costs to the individu-
als who are affected by it: Chambers can neither refute the charge that her proposal 
might contradict rather than enforce women’s preferences, nor demonstrate that 
prohibition is a requirement, or even a good way, of respecting women. as a result, 
her defence of prohibition is either unconvincing (as a requirement of respecting 
women), or unduly sacrifices the second moral obligation in favour of the first by ef-
fectively proposing to fight oppression at the costs of those currently oppressed (as a 
means to undermine the harmful norm). Overall, prohibition is then not a good way 
to address the twofold moral obligation entailed by harmful and discriminatory social 
norms, at least in the case of breast implants. in the remainder, i develop an alterna-
tive proposal based on four desiderata that aim to avoid the problems of Chambers’ 
proposal. note that, like prohibition, this proposal should not be understood as re-
placing conventional measures like education and media regulations. instead, it is 
meant to serve a complimentary role that takes into account the second moral obliga-
tion which conventional measures tend to neglect.
in the previous discussion, i have identified four main problems of Chambers’ 
proposal that ought to be avoided by a better alternative. First, prohibition dis-
regards women’s own informed judgement as to whether or not they should have 
breast implant surgery, hence disrespects them as desiring, choosing agents. Second, 
while (compulsorily) protecting women from the harms of compliance, prohibition 
does not address the harms of non-compliance, but instead might effectively expose 
women to these against their own choice. Third, prohibition risks promoting social 
change in an unjust way by undermining a harmful norm largely at the costs of those 
affected by it. Fourth, effectively, prohibition is biased in favour of the first moral 
obligation while neglecting the second. against this background, i propose the fol-
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lowing four desiderata for an alternative proposal. The alternative proposal should, 
first of all, make the decision to have breast implants a matter of truly informed consent. 
While the ultimate decision about having breast implants ought to remain with the 
individual woman, she needs to make that decision in light of knowledge about the 
discriminatory and objectifying nature of this practice. Second, the proposal should 
acknowledge both kinds of norm-induced harms, harms of compliance and harms of 
non-compliance, as collective wrongdoings against women which. This means that, 
until both kinds of harms are prevented, women are owed recognition and redress for 
having been wrongfully harmed by society. Third, since the existence of the harmful 
social norm constitutes a collective wrongdoing against women, the proposal needs to 
distribute the costs for social change and redress collectively, or at the very least has 
to refrain from imposing the lion’s share on the affected women. Fourth, the proposal 
needs to attend adequately to both moral obligations and not unduly neglect one in 
favour of the other. 
How do we implement these desiderata? With regard to the first desideratum, 
the matter seems to be quite straightforward. in addition to education campaigns 
that raise general awareness of the discriminatory and objectifying nature of the prac-
tice of breast implants, the relevant information could be specifically communicated 
as part of the physician-patient-consultation, or on the medical consent form that 
patients are required to sign before breast implant surgery. The relevant informa-
tion would not only include reference to the status harm that having breast implants 
might entail, but could also feature information about the harmful effects breast im-
plants might have on other women by increasing the acceptance and influence of the 
relevant norm.
The second desideratum requires addressing both kinds of unjust harms that 
are inflicted by the social norm, harms of compliance and harms of non-compliance. 
The discussion of prohibition suggests that, unless the harmful norm is fully elimi-
nated, it is in practice impossible to prevent women from being exposed to either one 
or the other. as with other cases where an agent (individual or, as assumed in this 
case, collective) is responsible for wrongfully harming someone, the agent is obliged 
to provide some form of redress to the victim. if we assume that a society, by main-
taining harmful norms, wrongfully inflicts these harms on women, members of the 
society would thus face a collective liability to redress the affected women. according 
to this idea, women would be entitled to compensation for the unjust harms they 
face due to the harmful social norm. One obvious way to implement such means 
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for redress would be to follow the common judicial practise of redressing not only 
economic and professional, but also physical and psychological harms by monetary 
means. monetary compensations seems to be a very crude measure for redressing the 
diverse kinds of harms inflicted by the relevant social norm. moreover, overestimat-
ing monetary compensation as a means to restore what women’s life would have been 
without the degrading social norm might itself constitute a form of disrespect. Yet, 
despite its obvious shortcomings, monetary compensation might fulfil both a sym-
bolic and a practical role in redressing the harms of the social norm. Symbolically, 
monetary compensation could at the very least express acknowledgment that the 
norm-induced harms are in fact a form of collective wrongdoing. in its practical role, 
monetary compensation could be used flexibly by each woman so as to best amelio-
rate the harm that the norm has caused her individually. 
The idea of monetary redress may thus rightly invoke mixed feelings, and re-
quires a more detailed discussion than i can provide here. Yet, in lack of a better 
alternative, i suggest we adopt it as a possible form of redress and consider in more 
detail what this suggestion would entail. With regard of harms of non-compliance, it 
would entail that women are entitled to compensation for the psychological, profes-
sional, or economic harms they suffer due to not conforming to the harmful norm. 
Yet, despite the option of monetary compensation for these harms of non-compli-
ance (and their awareness of status harm) women might still opt in favour of comply-
ing with the harmful norm. How, adhering to the second desideratum of addressing 
the harms that occur either way, should we proceed in these cases? it seems that, if a 
society is responsible for facing women with the dilemma of choosing between the 
harms of complying and the harms of not complying with a certain social norm, it is 
responsible for the harms that it inflicts on women on either horn of the dilemma. 
Hence, the fact that a woman declines compensation and opts for surgery does not 
exculpate the society that maintains the norm which motivates the woman’s decision 
from redressing the harms that she faces due to having the surgery. if anything, her 
decision is evidence that the crude attempts at monetarily mending the psychologi-
cal, economic, or professional harms are insufficient. as a result, the harms that she 
is facing due to the surgery are equally unjustly inflicted on her by society, hence 
equally mandate compensation.3  This would entail that women who decide to have 
3. Since i believe that the idea of monetary compensation for status harm is absurd and self-
defeating, the claim for compensation is meant to apply only to the physical and economic harms of 
compliance, leaving the problem of status harm unaddressed.
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surgery are entitled to monetary compensation not only for the immediate and long-
term physical harms they may suffer due to the operation, but also for the costs of 
the operation itself, as well as any related costs of medical treatment. in other words, 
the second desideratum of redressing the unjust harms of social norms effectively 
requires that we subsidize breast implant surgery. This has implications with regard 
to the fourth desideratum which will be discussed below.
Before that, consider briefly the third desideratum, which demands that the 
costs for undermining a harmful social norm be borne collectively, or at least do not 
disproportionately burden those affected by the norm. The alternative proposal de-
veloped here is meant to compliment education campaigns and media and advertise-
ment regulations with compensation payments for norm-induced harms. insofar 
as all of these measures are financed collectively by the society that maintains the 
harmful norm, and do not impose further harms on affected women, this desidera-
tum is fulfilled.
With regard to the fourth desideratum, which requires an adequate balancing of 
the obligation to undermine the harmful norm on the one hand, and the obligation 
to address the ongoing harming of women on the other, the situation is a little more 
complex. While the conventional measures, as argued above, primarily target the first 
moral obligation, the compensation payments for norm-induced harm are meant to 
target the second moral obligation. Unfortunately, we can again identify a problem-
atic tension between these two parts of the alternative proposal. This is not so much 
the case with the compensation payments for harms of non-compliance. To the con-
trary, as a welcome side effect, they are likely to decrease the incentives for having 
breast implants, hence support conventional measures in undermining the norm. 
But there is a conflict with regard to compensation payments for harms of compli-
ance, i.e. with regard to the subsidy and compensations for breast implant surgery. 
These monetary compensations for the harms of compliance are likely to encourage 
women to have breast implants, hence contradicting the first moral obligation. 
it is important to distinguish several scenarios of how the compensations might 
achieve this, for not all of them are equally problematic. For one thing, these com-
pensations could allow women who firmly desire to have breast implants but cannot 
afford them to act on that desire. On this understanding, compensation for the 
harms of compliance constitutes not so much an encouragement to undertake breast 
surgery but removes a decisive financial obstacle faced by some women. However, 
this aspect seems to be a desirable feature of the subsidy and compensation proposal 
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for it provides poor women with the same choice as more wealthy women. it thus 
enables all women to escape the psychological, economic, or professional harms of 
non-compliance via surgery given that their informed judgement is that this is the 
best choice for them.
at the same time, insofar as a subsidy and compensation payments for breast 
implant surgery increases the total number of women who have the surgery, there 
is a risk that having breast implants becomes more commonplace and acceptable. 
as a result, the harmful norm would become even more powerful and the pressure 
on women to have the surgery would increase. Finally, compensations for the harms 
of breast implant surgery would communicate what Chambers’ fears legalisation of 
breast implants communicates: that the harmful norm underlying the decision to 
have breast implants is worthy of respect, and that women’s feelings of inadequacy 
about their bodies are appropriate and require a surgical, rather than social, interven-
tion. The latter two scenarios both describe ways in which compensation payments 
for harms of compliance, in trying to address the injustice imposed by a harmful 
norm, work against the long-term goal of undermining the norm. Subsidy and com-
pensation payments may increase the norm’s power by making breast surgery more 
acceptable or required, or they may strengthen the norm by communicating that it is 
worthy of respect.
as a result, an alternative proposal that includes subsidies and compensation 
payments for having breast implants would fulfil the first three desiderata: it would 
make breast implant surgery a matter of informed consent; it would redress both kinds 
of norm-induced unjust harms, and it would distribute the costs for undermining the 
norm and redressing its unjust harms in a collective way. However, by increasing the 
respectability and acceptability of breast implants surgery, this proposal would make 
the harmful norm even more powerful and hence undermine the long-term goal of 
eliminating it. The proposal, then, would fail with respect to the fourth desideratum, 
because its attempts at addressing the harms of compliance would unduly compro-
mise the first moral obligation to eliminate the norm. in conclusion, a suitable alter-
native to prohibition would combine education campaigns and media regulations 
with compensation payments for the harms of non-compliance, but would need to 
refrain from subsidising and compensating having breast implants.
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5. COnCLUSiOn
Despite its nominal acknowledgement of the twofold moral obligation with 
regard to harmful and discriminatory social norms, prohibition, i argued, overall 
does not provide a good way to respond to both obligations. it constitutes either a 
problematic form of paternalism, a misguided way of respecting women as desiring, 
choosing agents, or undermines a harmful norm at the cost of those affected by it. 
instead, i showed, a combination of education campaigns and media regulations to-
gether with a system of compensation payments for harms of non-compliance pro-
vides the best way to address both moral obligations in combination.
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